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Abstract 
Since climate change threatens human wellbeing across the globe and into the future, 
we require a concept of wellbeing that encompasses an equivalent ambit. This paper 
argues that only a concept of human need can do the work required. It compares need 
theory with three alternative approaches. Preference satisfaction theory is criticised on 
the grounds of subjectivity, epistemic irrationality, endogenous and adaptive 
preferences, the limitlessness of wants, the absence of moral evaluation, and the non-
specificity of future preferences. The happiness approach is found equally wanting. 
The main section shows how these deficiencies can be addressed by a coherent theory 
of need. Human needs are necessary preconditions to avoid serious harm, are 
universalisable, objective, empirically grounded, non-substitutable and satiable. They 
are broader than ‘material’ needs since a need for personal autonomy figures in all 
theoretical accounts. While needs are universal, need satisfiers are most often 
contextual and relative to institutions and cultures. The satiability and non-
substitutability of needs is critical for understanding sustainability. The capability 
approaches of Sen and Nussbaum are compared but argued to be less fundamental. 
Finally, human needs provide the only concept that can ground moral obligations 
across global space and intergenerational time and thus operationalise ‘sustainable 
welfare’.  
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 ‘Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: 1) the concept of 
‘needs’… 2) the idea of limitations…’ (Brundtland Report, WCED 
1987: 43) 
 
Introduction 
Climate change threatens human wellbeing, not just in the ‘here and now’ but spatially 
across the globe, and temporally into the future including the far future. How can we 
conceive of human welfare over such a broad ambit? This paper argues that only a 
concept of human needs can do the theoretical work required. This work comprises (at 
least) the following. First, to conceive, measure and compare human wellbeing across 
time and space. This is essential because, as both Brundtland and Stern emphasise, 
mitigating climate change must be confronted simultaneously with addressing 
continuing global poverty, and both in a context of egregious global inequality. 
Second, to establish a secure moral grounding for pursuing these global goals and to 
provide guidance on priorities: here the distinction between needs and wants can play 
an important role. Third, to provide a convincing alternative to preference satisfaction 
theory, which encounters insuperable problems yet which remains the hegemonic 
theoretical approach to wellbeing.  
 
These claims are argued by comparing need theory with welfare economics and 
preference satisfaction; and more briefly with two other approaches to wellbeing: 
hedonic psychology and happiness, and the capability approach. 
 
One problem with advancing human need as an alternative measure of welfare in the 
past has been the relative paucity of theoretical work on the concept. For example, the 
Brundtland Report, having placed need centre-stage in its report, says nothing more 
about what needs are! Dobson’s (1998) interesting work on justice and the 
environment explicitly focuses on the contrast between needs and wants, but without 
any explication of the idea of need. We encounter a similar gap in literature on many 
welfare state policies, which require for their justification a distinction between needs 
and wants, a distinction which is rarely if ever addressed on a theoretical level. To 
take needs for granted in this way lays the concept open to neglect or ridicule or attack 
by advocates of the well-worked-out preference satisfaction theory. Thus the central 
section of this paper proposes a coherent theoretical framework for conceiving and 
analysing human needs.  
 
This paper begins with a short summary and critique of the dominant preference- or 
want-satisfaction approach. The second section sets out in some detail a theory of 
human need, drawing on our earlier book A Theory of Human Need and a selective 
survey of the resurgent literature. The third section elaborates further features of need-
satisfaction as an alternative criterion of human wellbeing, and extends its scope to 
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 both global and intergenerational comparisons. The fourth section compares this 
theory with the capabilities approach associated with Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum; it recognises broad similarities but pinpoints crucial differences. The fifth 
section considers the moral and justice implications, including obligations to meet the 
needs of ‘strangers’ across the world and in future generations. The sixth section 
summarises and concludes.1  
 
What do we mean by wellbeing? The older English term ‘welfare’ can be traced back 
to the fourteenth century, when it meant to journey well and could indicate both 
happiness and prosperity (Williams 1983). In the twentieth century it acquired two 
more specific but very different meanings. On the one hand, the field of welfare 
economics invented by the Cambridge economist Pigou defined welfare in terms of 
the subjective value to individuals of different bundles of goods. On the other hand, 
welfare came to be associated with the assessment of and provision for needs in the 
‘welfare state’, and acquired an increasingly objective, external interpretation. Later in 
the twentieth century, discourses on agency, participation and multidimensional views 
of poverty paved the way for the reinvention of the older idea of wellbeing, which can 
be traced back to Aristotle and the Buddha (Gough et al 2007). From now on I assume 
that both welfare and wellbeing (which terms are used interchangeably) are umbrella 
concepts with disputed meanings. Hence I consider the four schools of thought below 
as different interpretations of welfare or wellbeing.2 
 
Wants, preferences and consumer sovereignty 
What follows is a very brief summary of a well-trodden field (see Hausman and 
McPherson 2006 for an in depth treatment). Orthodox welfare economics rests on two 
fundamental principles. The first is that individuals are the best judges of their own 
interests, or more narrowly, their preferences or wants. Following from this, the 
second is the principle of consumer sovereignty: that what is produced and consumed 
should be determined by the private consumption and work preferences of individuals 
(Penz 1986). Although not widely recognised, together these claims form the 
foundation of both the normative arguments for markets and the monetary measures of 
economic success, such as income and GDP, that dominate our lives. Yet the ability of 
this framework to both understand and guide human behaviour can be challenged on 
several grounds, which apply a fortiori in the modern world threatened by climate 
change.  
 
1  The scope of this paper does not extend to discussions about the measurement of wellbeing, 
nor its empirical determinants, issues of causality, or questions of public policy. 
2  Amartya Sen has used ‘wellbeing’ in a distinct way to refer to ‘a person’s being seen from the 
perspective of her own personal welfare’, as contrasted with ‘agency goals’, which can 
include other goals such as pursuing the welfare of others (Sen 1993: 35-36). This usage does 
not appear to be a common one and I shall not follow it here. 
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 First, the idea that individuals are the sole authority in judging the correctness of their 
wants is severely compromised if there are limits to people’s knowledge and/or limits 
to their rationality in judging the correct means to their chosen ends. Regarding faulty 
knowledge, Penz concludes ‘wants based on ignorance are epistemically irrational’ 
(Penz 1986: 63). Hodgson (2013: 197), writing on ecological economics, puts it still 
more pithily: ‘Any welfare approach based on the presumption that individuals are 
always the best judges of their own interest falls at the first hurdle: many people 
neither understand nor accept the conclusions of the science of climate change’. As 
regards rationality, the entire body of work associated with Daniel Kahneman (2011) 
has demonstrated the numerous ways that people act and decide in irrational ways, 
particularly when faced with uncertainty. 
 
Related to this, second, is the problem of ‘adaptive preferences’ – the unconscious 
altering of our preferences in light of the options we have available (Elster 1982). Sen 
(1999) discusses this in terms of deprived people lowering their desires and 
reconciling themselves to fate, but it is also relevant in understanding the constant 
upward pressure on the desires of people in affluent societies which results in no more 
satisfaction (Easterlin 1974). This evolved facility is enormously helpful in enabling 
humans to accept fate – the ‘serenity to accept things that cannot be changed’. But it 
poses insuperable problems for welfare economics: if preferences adapt to 
circumstances, how can choice in markets provide a means of comparing the 
wellbeing of people in different circumstances, especially over global space and 
intergenerational time? 
 
Furthermore, markets and economic institutions themselves influence the evolution of 
values, tastes and preferences – even personalities (eg Bowles 1998). It has been 
shown, for example, that extending markets into more and more areas of life 
encourages the very self-interested behaviour assumed by welfare economic theory 
(Sandel 2012). Preferences are thus endogenous to such institutions, not exogenous 
and peculiar to individuals. For our purposes, a problematic consequence is the 
circularity of evaluation: if wants are shaped by the institutions and processes of 
production and distribution which meet those wants, then they cannot provide an 
independent standpoint with which to evaluate the functionings of those institutions 
and processes. Thus to proclaim the principle of consumer sovereignty is to respect 
the current factors and forces shaping preferences as either optimal or unchangeable. 
The dilemma of adaptive preferences is still more pressing in modern hyper-
consumption societies.  
 
Third, more generally, the model of Homo economicus has been subject to withering 
criticism from all directions: theoretical, experimental, sociological and 
historical/evolutionary. The fundamental assumption that every individual is actuated 
only by self-interest is simply wrong; behaviour can be and is also motivated by 
concern for others. In a long process of gene-culture co-evolution, humans have 
acquired a social morality and social preferences – ‘a concern for the wellbeing of 
others and a desire to uphold ethical norms…  People think that cooperating is the 
right thing to do and enjoy doing it, and they dislike unfair treatment and enjoy 
3 
 
 punishing those who violate norms of fairness’ (Bowles and Gintis 2011: 10, 38). 
These traits form the basis for anthropological and social studies of cultural values and 
their transmission, but are destructive for orthodox economic theory. Many efforts 
have been made to introduce into the theory a more rounded individual with ‘other 
regarding’ utility functions that takes into account the utility received by others. 
However, it then encounters severe problems in aggregating utilities across people 
(Hausman and McPherson 2006; cf. Hodgson 2013). 
 
Fourth, according to the neoclassical theory of consumption, there are no necessary 
limits to preferences and desires (Guillen Royo 2007, O’Neill 2011). Individuals can 
become satiated through the consumption of individual goods via the mechanism of 
diminishing marginal utility, but there are no necessary limits to satisfaction through 
consuming different goods and services. Indeed, a peculiarly avaricious agent is the 
standard assumption in neoclassical economics: a larger bundle of commodities is 
always preferable to a smaller one. The obvious logical possibility that people can 
exchange more ‘leisure’ for more consumption has been all but ignored in neo-
classical economics (Skidelsky and Skidelsky 2013). 
 
Fifth, specifying welfare entirely in terms of preferences ‘flattens moral distinction 
between the seriousness that different welfare demands make on both individual and 
social choices’ (O‘Neill 2011). The point is put well by Henry Shue: 
For standard economic analysis everything is a preference: the epicure’s 
wish for a little more seasoning, the starving child’s wish for a little 
water, the collector’s wish for one more painting, and the homeless 
person’s wish for privacy and warmth, all are preferences. 
Quantitatively, they are different because some are backed up by greater 
“willingness to pay” than others, but qualitatively a preference is a 
preference… (Shue, 1993:55). 
By contrast, as we shall see, human needs explicitly introduce moral criteria into the 
conception and appraisal of human wellbeing.  
 
Finally, preference satisfaction theory is particularly unsuited to considering the 
wellbeing of future generations, contributing to a narrow view of sustainability 
(O’Neill 2011, 2014). The preferences of future generations cannot be revealed 
through their choices or behaviour. How then can any provision for future generations 
be decided? The orthodox view is that what should be passed on is a stock of ‘capital’ 
that will permit a level of consumption per head at least as high as present. Solow, a 
Nobel economist, concluded that sustainability entails leaving ‘to the future the option 
or the capacity to be as well off as we are. It is not clear that one can be more precise 
than that’ (Solow 1991). From this it follows that ‘we do not owe to the future any 
particular thing. There is no specific object that the goal of sustainability, the 
obligation of sustainability, requires us to leave untouched’ (Solow 1993: 181). 
Preference satisfaction theory provides little guidance on the prerequisites for future 
wellbeing.  
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 The conclusion is that preference satisfaction cannot provide a logical or ethical 
conception and measure of human wellbeing – and especially so when we must 
consider wellbeing on a global and inter-generational scale.  
 
A note on happiness and subjective wellbeing 
Many of the same problems occur within a spectrum of other subjectivist conceptions 
of wellbeing. These include Kahneman’s (1999) conception of hedonic psychology – 
‘the study of what makes experiences and life pleasant or unpleasant’; Diener’s (1984, 
1994) detailed researches into life satisfaction; and Layard’s resurrection of the 
economics of happiness (2005). This work has developed useful measures of 
subjective wellbeing and a mass of solid findings on its determinants.  Interestingly 
these findings undermine the above opulence approach by demonstrating that, beyond 
a rather modest income level, happiness or subjective wellbeing is not associated with 
continuing growth in real incomes (Easterlin 1974). Layard contends that happiness 
provides a measure of wellbeing, a motivating device akin to Bentham’s balance of 
pleasure and pain, and a unifying principle to guide policy. 
 
Unfortunately, happiness theory and metrics face some similar problems to preference 
satisfaction theory (Gough et al 2007: 25-33; Gasper 2010). First, adaptation is 
pervasive; the process of adjusting expectations to reality appears to be a universal 
feature of the human condition applying to both losses and gains and to individual and 
collective events. Second, there is evidence of cultural bias: national values of 
individualism are correlated with reported wellbeing, so that cultures evoking a 
‘modesty bias’, as in some countries of East Asia, report lower wellbeing scores. 
Third, happiness may be dysfunctional in hostile environments, encouraging 
powerless people to believe they can significantly control their lives, and blaming 
themselves when they fail. These problems may be controlled for when comparing 
wellbeing within societies, and the approach yields important findings, for example on 
the role of hope in subjective wellbeing. However, they fatally undermine the ability 
of happiness to provide a measure of wellbeing across cultures and times.   
 
A theory of human need 
In this section I restate and develop the argument in our book A Theory of Human 
Need (hereafter THN).4 I contend that the idea of common human needs provides a 
superior theoretical framework with which to conceive of human welfare, which 
overcomes each of the critiques levelled against preference satisfaction. This is also 
the position of other theorists of human welfare from different backgrounds including 
4  Doyal and Gough 1991. The book was awarded both the Myrdal and Deutscher prizes in 1992 
and has been translated into Spanish, Italian, Chinese and Japanese. For a slightly different 
presentation see Gough 2003, 2014. 
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 Braybrooke (1987), Gasper (1996, 2009), Wiggins (1987, 2005), Brock (2009) and 
O’Neill (2011).5  
 
Our approach is hierarchical moving from universal goals, through basic needs to 
intermediate needs, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
  
5  For some subsequent debates and critiques see Soper 1993, Hamilton 2003, Thomson 2005, 
Reader 2005, 2007, Schuppert 2013. Des Gasper has for over two decades produced an 
insightful and comprehensive interrogation of the concepts of needs, wellbeing and associated 
ideas: 1996, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009. Another wide-ranging survey is Dean 2010.  
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 Figure 1: The theory of need in outline 
 
 
Identifying universal goals 
‘Need’ refers to a particular category of goals which are believed to be 
universalisable. The contrast with wants, goals which derive from an individual’s 
particular preferences and cultural environment, is central to our argument. The 
universality of need rests upon the belief that if needs are not satisfied then serious 
harm of some objective kind will result (cf Wiggins 2005). We define serious harm as 
the significantly impaired pursuit of goals which are deemed to be of value by 
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 individuals. Serious harm is ‘fundamental disablement in the pursuit of one’s vision of 
the good, whatever that vision is’ (THN 50). It is not the same as subjective feelings 
like anxiety or unhappiness.  
 
Another way of describing such harm is in terms of impaired social participation. 
Whatever our private and public goals, they must always be achieved on the basis of 
successful social interaction, past, present or future, with others. This definition 
explicitly acknowledges the social character of human action. Whatever the time, 
place and cultural group we grow up and live in, we act in it to some extent. 
Following Braybrooke (1987) we relate needs to what is necessary for social 
functioning. It follows that participation in some form of life without serious arbitrary 
limitations is ‘our most basic human interest’ (THN 50-55, chapter 5).  
 
Basic needs: health and autonomy 
Basic needs are then the universalisable preconditions for non-impaired participation 
in any form of life. Can these common prerequisites for avoiding serious harm be 
identified more systematically without smuggling in too specific a theory of the good? 
The approach in THN was to ask what physical and mental capacities a person must 
possess to pursue their goals, whatever these goals are. To do this a person must be 
able to formulate aims, beliefs about how to achieve them, and act to strive to achieve 
them in practice. Thus whatever a person’s goals, whatever the cultural practices and 
values within which she lives, she will require certain prerequisites in order to strive 
towards those goals. In this way we identify physical survival/health and personal 
autonomy as the most basic human needs – those which must be satisfied to some 
degree before actors can effectively participate in their form of life to achieve any 
other valued goal (THN 54). I discuss each in turn. 
 
Survival alone cannot do justice to what it means to be a person, as a discussion of the 
victim of a motor accident in a deep coma on life support reveals.6 Thus it is physical 
health which is a basic human need. To complete a range of practical tasks in daily 
life requires manual, mental and emotional abilities with which poor physical health 
usually interferes. We recognise that defining health and illness is not easy and 
empirically rebut claims that conceptions of health are always internal to cultural 
systems of thought and thus inherently contesable. We tackle this by considering 
persons from different cultures suffering from (what the biomedical model terms) TB. 
However different peoples name and explain their illness, they will all suffer one or 
more dimensions of disability. They will also regard their situation as abnormal – 
unless there is some reason like famine or plague why most others are also failing in 
health – and will seek to overcome it.  
 
However, limiting the idea of need to maintaining physical health and its pre-
requisites is quite inadequate. It would be open to Sen’s (1984) claim that ‘need’ is a 
more passive concept than capability; that it is associated with dependence and the 
6  Whether or not such a victim regains the capacity to act will eventually determine his or her 
fate.  
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 person as a patient. Our second universal need is autonomy, which requires a longer 
discussion. 
 
Autonomy 
We define basic autonomy as the ‘the ability to make informed choices about what 
should be done and how to go about doing it’ (THN 53). This foundation of human 
purposive action is applicable to a wide variety of human contexts and predicaments, 
from oppressive and totalitarian contexts to ones with wide options for creative 
participation. But all can entail creative reflection; indeed, the poor and oppressed 
must perforce act autonomously and creatively for much of their lives in order to 
achieve minimal goals (THN: 59-69, 180-187; Gough 2014). 
 
Three key variables, we argue, affect levels of individual autonomy of agency (THN 
59–59). First, cognitive and emotional capacity is a necessary pre-requisite for a 
person to initiate an action. Since all actions have to embody a modicum of reason to 
be classed as actions at all, it is difficult to give a precise definition of the minimum 
levels of rationality and responsibility present in the autonomous individual. At its 
most basic level it can be understood negatively as mental illness. Mental health is 
then the obverse of this – ‘practical rationality and responsibility’ (THN 62). We again 
address, though by no means systematically, some of the difficult issues of 
conceptualising and measurement this poses, citing evidence on the experiences and 
symptoms of mental illness across cultures. For example, we conclude in the case of 
severe depression that there is a common core of disabling symptoms found in all 
cultures, including hopelessness, indecisiveness, a sense of futility and lack of energy 
(THN 180). These common symptoms lead to the same kinds of disability across 
cultures, notwithstanding divergent – and even incompatible – ways of interpreting 
them. 
 
The second determinant of individual levels of autonomy is the level of cultural 
understanding a person has about herself, her culture and what is expected of her as an 
individual within it. These understandings will include both universal competences, 
such as the acquisition of language in early childhood, and a host of socially specific 
skills (which, though variable can be objectively appraised).  To deny a person such 
basic cognitive capacities is to threaten his self-respect. Third, autonomy of agency 
requires a range of opportunities to undertake socially significant activities. By 
‘significant’ we mean activities which are central in all societies.7 Again, there is a 
problem in determining minimum opportunity sets, given that even the most 
oppressed of people can and will exercise choices. Nevertheless, some minimum 
freedom of agency is an essential component of autonomy of agency in all cultures. 
7  Braybrooke (1987) classifies these as the roles of parent, householder, worker and citizen. We 
rephrase these as the acting in the realms of production, reproduction, cultural transmission 
and political authority (THN ch.5), about which more below.  
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 We use these three components to operationalise and measure autonomy and its 
absence (THN ch 9).8  
This autonomy of agency enables people to achieve a minimally disabled level of 
participation in their social environment. But we can go on to distinguish a higher 
level of critical autonomy: ‘the capacity to compare cultural rules, to reflect upon the 
rules of one’s own culture, to work with others to change them and, in extremis, to 
move to another culture’ (THN 187). This requires, beyond freedom of agency, some 
measure of political freedom. At this level, drawing on imagination, past examples or 
comparisons with other ways of life, people can begin to question the doxa or taken-
for-granted cultural frames of their own ways of life. In the 21st century such 
questioning is all the more necessary. This distinct notion of critical participation is 
illustrated on the right-hand side of Figure 1.  
 
This concludes my brief discussion of autonomy as the second universal basic human 
need. This makes clear that need theory is far from a passive conception extolling 
dependency. Indeed it brings it closer to the capability approach discussed below. I 
hope it also dispels an opposite critique: that our theory of human need posits a crassly 
individualist view of personhood that undergirds the preference satisfaction approach 
– an asocial Western view of man. We emphatically reject this critique. On the 
contrary we conceive autonomy as a relational, not an individualistic, concept. People 
build a self-conception of their own capabilities through interacting with and learning 
from others (THN 76-80). Autonomy presupposes interdependence.9  
 
O’Neill (2011) goes further, arguing that needs theory, whilst clearly advocating 
autonomy, avoids a ‘vice’ of Homo economicus and preference-satisfaction theory: 
what MacIntyre (1999) calls ‘unacknowledged dependence’ and Benson (1983) 
‘arrogant self-sufficiency’. Claims of self-sufficient individuals ignore our 
dependence, not only on other people but also on planetary physical and biological 
systems. ‘There is hubris in the failure to acknowledge our dependence on natural 
processes and the limits of our knowledge of these processes and our capacities to 
control them’. The concept of needs ‘may have its own virtues in drawing attention to 
the vulnerabilities and dependence that are constitutive of human life’ (O’Neill 2011: 
38). This is of central importance when considering sustainable wellbeing in the 
context of environmental threats such as climate change. 
 
8  There is considerable overlap here with research within Sen’s capabilities approach. For 
example, Burchardt et al (2013) define autonomy as choice, control and empowerment in 
critical areas of a person’s life, and distinguish three components: self reflection, active 
decision-making and having a range of (high quality) options. 
9  In a study of the expression of autonomy in Bangladesh we conclude, ‘Individual autonomy 
must always be achieved in an institutional context, and this assumes interdependence. Any 
concept of autonomy which does not begin from this ontological fact is worthless’ (Devine et 
al 2008: 113). 
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 Biological constraints on human needs 
The above argument has assumed a biological background to human needs: it accepts 
the constraints on human needs given by prior evolution and our genetic structure.  
We are linked to other animals in a variety of ways, through being bipedal mammals, 
warm blooded, suckling, naked descendants of apes, with an upright gait and flexible 
hands. But we also have large, developed brains and a corresponding capacity 
unmatched in evolution to communicate with each other, to reason and to create 
projects. As a direct result of our brain size which has necessitated the relatively early 
birth of human babies, we have a remarkably extended period of dependence in 
childhood. These features roughly define human nature as distinct from that of dogs or 
trout, say. They set natural boundaries on human needs (THN 37). Our mammalian 
constitution shapes our needs for such things as food and warmth in order to survive 
and maintain health. Our cognitive aptitudes and the bases of our emotionality in 
childhood shape many other needs – for supportive and close relationships with 
others, for example.  
 
The recognition of genetic and biological constraints distinguishes human need theory 
from alternative approaches to wellbeing. But ‘constraint’ must not be confused with 
‘determination’. There are numerous examples where choices of reasons and actions 
may challenge genetic predispositions, even if the latter can be objectively 
established. It is for this reason that we reject what is probably still the most famous 
analysis of human needs: that of Abraham Maslow (1954). This is a theory of 
motivations or drivers of human action; whereas ours is a theory of universalisable 
goals. One result is that the pursuit of universal human needs will not necessarily be 
internally motivated; one may desire things harmful to need–satisfaction and not 
desire essential need satisfiers. Need theories like ours ‘lack a behavioural motor 
behind them’, in Gasper’s words (2007: 66). There will be many times when motives, 
and the preferences they support, will drive the meeting of basic needs, but that cannot 
be assumed (Gasper provides a careful analysis of these issues).  
 
The eudaimonic school of psychology studies the biological and evolutionary 
foundations of human needs but avoids these problems and provides powerful support 
for our approach (Ryan and Deci 2001, Ryan and Sapp 2007). Starting from the non-
controversial observation that all living things need nourishment, a variety of harms 
result when this is not available, as all tenders of house plants know. In the case of the 
human species, they identify universal psychological needs, and propose cross-
cultural ways of measuring their satisfaction. These needs comprise, first, autonomy: 
the propensity to self-regulate one’s actions and to endorse one’s own behaviour; 
secondly, competence: feeling able to attain outcomes and operate effectively within 
one’s environment; and thirdly, relatedness: feeling cared for, and significant for, 
others, and a sense of being integral to one’s social organisation. These needs are 
cross-cultural: all humans require that they be met in order to experience wellbeing 
(Ryan and Sapp 2007). Their conclusion mirrors that of THN (though they were 
arrived at independently): that basic needs are universal and it is possible in principle 
and in practice to compare levels of basic need-satisfaction across cultures (THN 73–
74; see below).  
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Needs and need satisfiers 
While basic needs are universal, many goods, services, activities and relationships 
required to satisfy them are culturally and temporally variable. For example, the needs 
for food and shelter apply to all peoples, but there are a large variety of cuisines and 
forms of dwelling which can meet any given specification of nutrition and protection 
from the elements. We follow Max-Neef (1989) in distinguishing these need satisfiers 
from human needs. This distinction plays an important part in rebutting another 
common objection: that need theory is paternalist and insensitive to context.  
 
However, if this were all we could say, it would land us back with a relativism: having 
identified basic human needs we could say no more about routes to their satisfaction. 
Can a conceptual bridge be built to link basic needs and specific satisfiers? We 
contend that the notion of ‘universal satisfier characteristics’ can fulfil that role (THN 
155-157). If we define ‘satisfier characteristics’ as that set of all characteristics that 
have the property of contributing to the satisfaction of our basic needs in one or any 
cultural setting, then we can in principle identify a subset of universal satisfier 
characteristics (USCs): those characteristics of satisfiers which apply to all cultures. 
USCs are thus those properties of goods, services, activities and relationships which 
enhance physical health and human autonomy in all cultures. For example, calories a 
day for a specified group of people constitutes a characteristic of (most) foodstuffs 
which has transcultural relevance. This bridging role of USCs is illustrated in Figure 
1. 
 
To identify these USCs, we turn to two sorts of scientific understanding. First, there is 
the best available scientific/ technical knowledge articulating causal relationships 
between physical health or autonomy and the numerous factors impacting on them. 
Second, there is comparative anthropological knowledge about practices in the 
numerous cultures and sub-cultures, states and political systems in the contemporary 
world. Thus to begin with it is the codified knowledge of the natural and social 
sciences that enable us to determine the composition of such ‘intermediate’ needs. 
This knowledge changes and typically expands through time. The concept of human 
need we develop is historically open to such continual improvements in 
understanding, for example the astonishing advances in the biomedical understanding 
of health and disease. 
 
Such codified knowledge is inherently elitist, which gives rise to another common 
criticism of the needs approach – that it is paternalist at best, totalitarian at worst. But 
this criticism is deflected by a further epistemic requirement – that such codified 
knowledge must be complemented by the appeal to the experientially grounded 
knowledge of people (THN 120-126, 309-310). The world is replete with examples 
where ‘top-down’ knowledge is imposed on peoples without any understanding of 
context and practical knowledge, resulting in oppressive or absurd outcomes. 
Conversely, there are numerous examples of the countervailing advantages of 
participation and decentralisation, admirably theorised by Alkire (2002, ch.4).  
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 Thus any rational and effective attempt to resolve disputes over how best to meet 
needs must bring to bear both the codified knowledge of experts and the experiential 
knowledge of those whose basic needs and daily life world are under consideration. It 
requires a dual strategy of public policy formation which values compromise, 
provided that this does not extend to defining the general character of basic human 
needs (THN 141). This also applies to understanding the synergies and conflicts 
between satisfiers of different groups of needs (Max-Neef 1992). It follows that 
identifying need satisfiers is a collective process, akin to Dewey’s idea of ‘social 
intelligence’ (Dewey 1935; Hodgson 2013). It is the very opposite of individuals 
arriving at their own preferences, or, far more common today, arriving at them within 
a context of vested interests and constellations of power.  Reasons for needing are 
essentially public, drawing on a shared understanding of what sorts of strategies 
actually do avoid harm.  
 
The epistemology of needs 
Finally, this provides another way of summarising the distinction between need and 
preference: the concept of need is objective whereas that of preference is subjective. 
The truth of the claim that a person needs clean water depends on the objective 
physiological requirements of human beings and the nature of the satisfier, including 
its capacity to contribute to the health of the person. In contrast, the truth of the claim 
that a person prefers Bowie to the Beatles depends on the nature of the person’s 
beliefs about and attitudes towards the objects. Put another way, statements about 
wants are intentional, whereas statements of need are ‘extentional’: their truth depends 
on ‘the way the world is’ and not ‘the workings of my mind’ (Wiggins 1987: 152). It 
is quite possible to need something that you do not want; indeed you may need it 
without even knowing of its existence, as a diabetic needs insulin to avoid serious 
harm (THN 42). 
 
Further implications of theorising human needs 
At this point the major features of our theory of human need have been summarised, 
as illustrated in Figure 1. (The final level, ‘social preconditions’, will be discussed 
below). The paper now considers some more implications of the approach, including 
trans-generational needs, which further distinguish it from preference theories. 
 
Non-substitutability and lists of needs 
Unlike preferences, human needs are not additive. Certain packages of need satisfiers 
are necessary for the avoidance of harm. ‘One domain of intermediate need-
satisfaction cannot be traded off against another’ (THN 166; cf Nussbaum 2000: 81). 
More education is of no help to someone who is starving. Human needs are 
irreducibly plural. This is quite different from preferences where continuity is the 
default assumption: given any two goods in a bundle it is always possible – by 
reducing the amount of one fractionally and increasing the amount of the other 
fractionally – to define another bundle which is indifferent to the first (O’Neill 2011). 
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 The construction of lists of needs follows from this. In THN, the category of USCs 
provides a list of derived or second-order goals, which must be achieved if the first-
order goals of health and autonomy are to be attained (THN 155-59; Gough 2003; 
2014).  We group these USCs, or ‘intermediate needs’, in the following eleven 
categories: nutritional food and clean water, protective housing, non-hazardous living 
and work environments, safe birth control and child-bearing, appropriate health care; 
significant primary relationships, security in childhood, physical and economic 
security, and appropriate education. Broadly speaking, the first six contribute to 
physical health and the last five to autonomy. 
 
There exist many other similar lists, differing in their ‘verbal wrappings’ and 
ontological and epistemological features. Alkire’s thorough research (2002) finds 
thirty-nine lists of dimensions of human development, ranging from Nussbaum’s 
central human functional capabilities to Max-Neef’s axiological categories, from 
Narayan’s dimensions of well-being to Qizilbash’s prudential values for development. 
She focuses on nine, including THN, and identifies a wide overlap. In an exercise 
comparing Nussbaum’s influential list with our own, I note that her ‘affiliation’ is 
similar to our central goal of participation and practical reason is closely related to our 
basic need for autonomy; our need for health includes her ‘bodily integrity’ alongside 
‘bodily health’ (Gough 2003, 2014). These in turn map closely on Ryan’s basic 
psychological needs for relatedness, competence and autonomy, introduced above. 
These very substantial overlaps give us confidence in enabling need theory to provide 
substantive guidance for tracking and satisfying unmet needs. 
 
Satiability, sufficiency and need thresholds  
The non-additivity of need is related to another feature quite distinct from preference: 
need is a threshold concept or, put another way, basic needs and intermediate needs 
(USCs) are satiable. Even in the case of health and autonomy, thresholds can be 
conceived where serious harm is avoided such that non-disabled social participation 
can take place. The distributive principle entailed by the needs approach is to 
minimise ‘shortfall equality’: the shortfall of actual achievement from the optimum 
average (Sen 1992; Ruger 2009). The implied goal is sufficientarian: to bring all 
individuals up to such a threshold. It says nothing at this stage about inequalities 
above this level. 
 
But how are appropriate thresholds to be decided and measured? In our case, the idea 
of ‘appropriate’ has to be defined at the level of both basic needs and USCs (see 
Gough 2014: 375-378 for a longer treatment).  
 
In terms of health and autonomy, our approach endorses neither absolute minimum, 
nor culturally relevant standards, but an optimum standard. ‘In principle, such 
satisfaction is adequate when, using a minimal amount of appropriate resources, it 
optimises the potential of each individual to sustain their participation in those 
constitutive activities important for furthering their critical interests’ (Doyal and 
Doyal 2013: 14). Such critical optimum levels of health and autonomy can be 
operationalised in practice by reference to the best level of need-satisfaction attained 
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 anywhere in the world at the present time, or a higher standard which is materially 
feasible at the present time (THN 160).10 At a more aggregated level, cross-national 
indicators of objective wellbeing can be compiled and comparisons made; these 
suggest that the Scandinavian countries remain good exemplars. In the real world, this 
optimum threshold can and will be constrained due to stymied development and 
inadequate resources, notably in the global South. Here a constrained optimum can be 
devised, reflecting the best standards achieved by nations or other social groups at 
different levels of development.11 ‘Ought implies can’, a precept which raises many 
issues of global inequality and injustice which cannot be addressed here. Suffice it to 
note that ‘optimise’ is not the same as ‘maximise’.  
 
At the next level – USCs - we identify a ‘minimum optimorum’ or minopt threshold. 
We argue that increasing inputs of USCs, such as nutrition or child security, will 
typically yield increasing increments of health or autonomy but with diminishing 
returns – beyond a certain point there is no further benefit. In principle, this defines 
threshold levels of each USC.12 In practice, there are problems in the area of health 
care where huge resources can secure marginal improvements in health (Ruger 2009), 
and to a lesser extent in education and economic security. But in principle the method 
for identifying a sufficiency level or range is clear (THN ch.10). 
 
The needs of future generations 
The Brundtland Report refers to the needs of people in the present and the future, and 
I turn now to demonstrate that our need theory can conceptualise wellbeing across 
generations.  
 
To begin with, the basic needs of future generations of humans will be the same as 
those of present humans. To avoid serious harm and to participate and act within 
future human societies people will require the same logical preconditions: not just 
survival, but health and autonomy. The epistemology of reasoning about needs 
remains extensional, not intentional, and thus avoids the indeterminacy of reasoning 
about future preferences. 
 
Furthermore, the broad categories of USCs will apply to future generations of humans 
as much as the present. This stems from the biological, physiological and 
psychological foundations of human needs outlined above. Until the genetic make-up 
of Homo sapiens changes significantly, we can assume that the same universal 
satisfier characteristics will apply. Future people will have needs for affiliation, 
cognitive and emotional expression, understanding and critical thought. To achieve 
these they will need specific minima or minopt levels of water and nutrition, shelter, a 
10  Cf Burchardt et al (2013) on comparing levels of autonomy.  
11  Writing in the late 1980s we concluded that the best performing middle income country was 
Costa Rica and the best poor nation was Sri Lanka (THN ch.13). 
12  In some cases, larger quantities of satisfiers become positively harmful, such as vitamins A 
and D, indicating a maximum as well as a minimum threshold (THN 161-164). 
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 non-threatening environment and work practices, significant primary relationships, 
security in childhood, physical and economic security, education and health care.  
 
Together, this amounts to a remarkable – and pretty obvious – degree of knowledge 
about the constituents of future peoples’ wellbeing. Compared to the indeterminacy of 
future generations’ preferences a theory of need provides some firm foundations on 
which to build sustainability targets for public policy. For example, given the limits to 
the substitutability of different need satisfiers, we can say more about what needs to 
be ‘passed down’ to future generations. In O’Neill’s (2011: 33) words (and using the 
terminology of functionings): ‘Each generation needs to pass down the conditions for 
livelihood and good health, for social affiliation, for the development of capacities for 
practical reasoning, for engaging with the wider natural world and so on’.13  
 
However, there remains much greater uncertainty about the specific need satisfiers for 
achieving such future need satisfactions. This reflects among other things our inherent 
ignorance about the pace and direction of future technological change. While specific 
numbers of calories and nutrients will be needed, we cannot know how agricultural 
techniques and food production will or could change. We do now know what 
breakthroughs in preventive or genetically based health care will take place. We do 
not know what new threats to human security will require extensive or novel forms of 
remedial action. At this level, we remain ignorant about the detailed nature and 
quantum of need satisfiers that future peoples in future contexts will require to achieve 
USC thresholds.  
 
Societal preconditions for sustainable wellbeing 
However, we can say more about the institutional satisfiers or societal preconditions 
for delivering need satisfactions in the future. These will vary over time and space, but 
it is possible again to identify certain universal ‘societal preconditions’ which have to 
be satisfied by all collectives if they are to survive and flourish over long periods of 
time. Following Braybrooke (1987: 48–50), we identify four such preconditions: 
production, reproduction, cultural transmission and political authority (THN chs 5, 
11. See Figure 1).14  
 
To take just the first, for example, all economic systems would need to be assessed 
according to their ability to produce enough appropriate need satisfiers. However, the 
plurality, complexity and interdependence of human needs requires a model of the 
economy with richer features than orthodox macro-economic models (THN 230-236). 
Rather than aggregates of income or capital, qualitative distinctions are called for: 
between the production of need satisfiers that eliminate shortfall inequality and 
surplus goods which do not, between the effective and ineffective transformation of 
13  But this does not entail, as he writes in the previous sentence, ‘each generation to pass on a 
bundle of incommensurable goods that is disaggregated across the different dimensions of 
human functioning’. This is to move too quickly from needs to satisfiers, without passing 
through USCs. 
14  By reproduction, we mean both procreation and child care and socialization (THN 83-86). 
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 need satisfiers into need satisfactions within households and communities. And this is 
to leave out the production of a full range of capital goods – man-made, human, 
social, and natural – both substitutable and non-substitutable. (Conventional GDP 
does not even achieve the first requisite, having no distinction between need satisfiers 
and ‘luxuries’ or ‘surplus goods’). Similar auditing is necessary of institutions 
providing for biological reproduction and care of children, the transmission and 
renewal of cultural understandings, and the exercise of political authority.  
 
Thus a conception of human need imposes a more demanding audit of social 
institutions than does preference satisfaction theory. For wellbeing to be sustained 
over time, a rich nexus of qualitatively different, incommensurable institutions must 
be passed on to future generations (as Hodgson 2013 and others have argued). 
 
Finally, in the spirit of Dewey’s social intelligence and collective deliberation, need 
theory implies a requirement for cross-generational dialogue. In place of either total 
ignorance about future wellbeing or the imposition of current views about wellbeing 
on future generations, we need to recognise that there can be ‘an ongoing dialogue 
about the nature of the good life that crosses generations’ (O’Neill 2014). Of course 
that is impossible with distant generations, but to think one generation ahead is 
conceivable and sufficient: the process can then be repeated by the next generation, 
and so on. After all, following the rapid growth of life expectancy, four generations 
commonly coexist in societies today, and it is not impossible to reason about the needs 
of the next. A variety of institutions are emerging to represent the interests of near-
future generations, such as Finland’s Committee for the Future and Hungary’s 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Future Generations (Coote 2012). 
 
Needs and the capabilities approach 
I turn now to compare the needs approach with the capabilities approach. As first 
defined by Amartya Sen, the idea of human capabilities provides a way of conceiving 
wellbeing alternative to both the orthodox opulence and utility approaches. Instead it 
conceives wellbeing in terms of the substantive freedoms and opportunities that 
people possess. Expanding freedom is desirable for at least three reasons: it is 
intrinsically desirable, it is instrumentally important in enabling the attainment of 
other desired ends, and it can play a constructive role in moulding these desired ends 
(Sen, 1999; Alkire 2002). But capability rests on a prior conception, functionings: ‘an 
achievement of a person: what she or he manages to do or to be’ (Sen 1985: 12). 
Elsewhere Sen writes that functionings ‘constitute a person’s being’. Since some (not 
all) of these functionings are ‘intrinsically valuable’ they amount to states of well-
being (Sen 1992: 4–7). A person’s capability set then represents all the combinations 
of functionings that are feasible to a person – that she could choose.  
 
The capability approach has mounted a powerful challenge to orthodox welfare 
economics, has helped to establish a more rounded conception of the human person 
than Homo economicus, and has founded the only globally accepted alternative metric 
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 to GDP so far – the Human Development Index. Furthermore it shares several 
common features with the needs approach advocated here. They include (Sen 2009: 
chs 11-13): 
 A rejection of utility/happiness, resources, and crude ‘basic physiological needs’ 
approaches 
 A recognition of the complexity of human lives and the plurality and non-
commensurability of needs/functionings 
 A recognition that interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing are essential and not 
impossible 
 A critique of ‘unexamined sentiments’ and an advocacy of reflective and public 
reasoning 
 A conception of obligations to others. 
With so much in common, what is to be gained by insisting on the needs approach? 
There are two fundamental problems with the capabilities alternative: first, there 
appears to be no way of identifying basic universal functionings and capabilities, and 
second, capabilities are extremely difficult to operationalise. Though the second is less 
fundamental, I start with this. The capability set of a person includes not only the 
opportunities to have and to be that people actually choose but also the near-infinite 
counterfactual opportunities that were open to them that they did not choose. Rawls’ 
(1999) regarded the capability approach as too ‘informationally demanding’ and 
others have echoed this criticism. One response to this is to argue that chosen 
functionings can act as proxies for capabilities: one’s health status can act as a proxy 
for one’s substantive freedom and opportunity to be healthy. However, since the list of 
potential functionings that people ‘have reason to value’ is almost endless (to be a 
good parent, to play football, to make lots of money), this leads back to subjective 
choice, unless discriminations are made between different functionings.  
 
Yet the approach provides no means for identifying basic functionings common to a 
group of people let alone to all people. Sen’s oeuvre provides examples of significant 
functionings but in an unsystematic way. They include being happy, being able to 
choose, having good health, being adequately fed and sheltered, having self-respect, 
being able to appear in public without shame, and taking part in the life of the 
community. Though we may well value all these things, it is a rather strange list. It 
embraces subjective states (being happy) and objective states (being adequately fed), 
and culturally generalisable conditions (having good health) alongside specifically 
liberal values (being able to choose). It is not self-evident that all these are 
‘intrinsically’ significant in defining well-being. Sen famously rejects the search for, 
and lists of, universal valued functionings. Yet without such a list, achieved human 
functionings cannot be compared across radically different cultures or across time.15 
15  One intriguing solution proposed by Vizard (2006) is to derive a list of basic functionings 
from the international rights framework. This has the benefit of achieving some cross-national 
legitimacy, but it inverts the normal derivation of human rights from more foundational 
concepts of entitlements. Another solution is to add measures of autonomy alongside 
functionings to arrive at a composite measure of capability (Alkire 2005; Burchardt and 
Vizard 2011).  
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Nussbaum, as we have seen, does argue for the universalisability of human functional 
capabilities and is content to identify these in a cross-cultural way. But to justify this, 
in her later book, Frontiers of Justice, she relies heavily on the language of need: 
‘human need is a relatively stable matter, and thus there is some hope that we can give 
an account of basic human needs that will remain reasonably constant over time… the 
idea of what human beings need for fully human living is among the most vivid 
intuitive ideas we share’ (Nussbaum 2006: 278, 279). Gasper (2005) and Brock 
conclude that the capability approach is then derivative of the need approach. ‘The 
notion of need is a valuable member of the team of concepts widely used in 
discussions of global justice, both in the capabilities and the human rights approaches. 
The case for these is often built on the more fundamental concept of needs’ (Brock 
2009: 73-4).  
 
The needs approach also addresses more directly issues of sustainability and 
intergenerational comparability, topics rarely addressed within the capability 
approach. Sen (2009: 250) recognises the importance of the Brundtland definition but 
contends that its reliance on human needs is insufficiently ‘capacious’. ‘Certainly 
people do have needs, but they also have values and, in particular cherish their ability 
to reason, appraise, participate, choose and act. Seeing people only in terms of their 
needs may give us a rather meagre view of humanity’. This repeats an earlier criticism 
which this paper has been at pains to refute. But In rejecting needs, Sen is left with a 
very thin protection for future generations in a current world where present actions are 
wreaking environmental devastation and unconstrained consumption of natural 
resources. According to Lessmann (2011:58) ‘The capability approach offers a theory 
that respects the freedom of choice of people whether they live today or in the future. 
Thus the CA does not prescribe a certain type of life for either the current or future 
generations and in consequence does not schedule sustaining a certain state of the 
world’. In contrast, Nussbaum’s quite different, universalist approach ultimately relies 
on the idea of basic human needs applicable now and in the future. The capability 
approach cannot ‘dispense with the concept of needs, at any rate when applied to 
sustainable development’ (Boulanger 2011: 99). 
 
In a nutshell, the capability approach needs the underpinning of need theory. 
  
Needs, morality and justice in a global and intergenerational context 
Wants or preferences, we have noted, flatten moral distinctions between human 
situations. By contrast, human need and the criterion of serious harm bring moral 
judgements to centre-stage.  This is recognised by a variety of authors. ‘Claims of 
need make moral demands on agents that preferences do not’ (O’Neill 2011). And in 
the language of capabilities: ‘In certain core areas of human functioning a necessary 
condition of justice for a public political arrangement is that it delivers to citizens a 
certain basic level of capability. If people are systematically falling below the 
threshold in any of these core areas, this should be seen as a situation both unjust and 
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 tragic’ (Nussbaum 2000, 71). This issue raises big questions, but a few notes must 
suffice here.  
 
Since Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) it has been common to distinguish social 
institutions as a distinct domain of moral assessment, distinct, that is, from the actions 
of individuals or collectives. The former refers to arguments of justice, the latter to 
arguments of ethics (Pogge and Moellendorf 2008, Pogge and Horton 2008). I discuss 
them briefly in reverse order.  
 
Ethical arguments for universal need satisfaction 
Our argument in THN for moral obligations to meet the basic needs of people moves 
through three stages: meeting needs within a collectivity up to the level of a nation 
state, meeting global human needs, and meeting the needs of future generations. They 
can be summarised as follows (see THN chapter 6 for the full argument).  
 
We begin from the argument that, since the membership of any social group implies 
obligations or duties, it also implies that the members are in fact able to perform these 
duties. The ascription of a duty logically entails that the bearer of the duty is entitled 
to the need satisfaction necessary to enable her or him to undertake that duty. It is 
inconsistent for a social group to lay responsibilities on some person without ensuring 
she has the wherewithal to discharge those responsibilities.  
 
Where the social group is large, this entails similar obligations to strangers, whose 
unmet needs we do not directly witness and can do nothing individually to satisfy. 
This will require support for agencies that guarantee to meet the needs of strangers. 
This is a plausible definition of a ‘welfare state’: public rights or entitlements to the 
means to human welfare in general and to minimum standards of well-being in 
particular, independent of rights based on status, property or income. It assumes that 
only a state can guarantee strong entitlements of this sort to people, though this does 
not require that it directly provides the satisfiers.  
 
This much is broadly accepted within countries across the developed world, though 
subject to constant critique and counter-movements. However, the commitment to 
meet the needs of strangers in other countries raises difficult new issues that cannot be 
addressed here. Suffice it to say that the universality of human need strongly 
underpins obligations to ameliorate serious harm across the globe. In our inherently 
interconnected world, such a commitment to meet the needs of strangers and to 
support the necessary welfare structures cannot stop at the arbitrary borders of any 
particular nation state. It lends powerful support to contemporary ideas of 
cosmopolitanism, which sees the entire world as a potential moral and political 
community (Held 2010). To some this sounds utopian, but it is lent some legitimacy 
and practicality by the system of international rights legislation and implementation in 
the contemporary world.  
 
Finally, it follows that we also have obligations to protect future generations against 
serious harm, if such harms can be reasonably predicted (Shue 2014). We have duties 
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 to ensure that the global life support system is not so damaged that it threatens the 
basic needs or USCs of future peoples, for example their nutritional or health needs. 
This typically raises difficult questions given that future generations are unable to 
reciprocate the duties required of the present. However, the idea of universal human 
needs provides two supporting arguments. First, we have obligations to meet the 
needs of our children and grandchildren within the overlapping (four) generation 
nature of society discussed above. Second, their wellbeing will be severely 
compromised if they live in a world where their neighbours, fellow citizens and 
unknown global strangers suffer profound harm (see also THN ch.7).  
 
Justice arguments for universal need satisfaction 
As for many others, our starting point is Rawls’ theory of justice, which will not be 
rehearsed here. In pursuing a thin theory of the good he does not discuss basic human 
needs and the extent to which their satisfaction is necessary for achieving his two 
principles of justice.16 Or rather, he does not, except for a remarkable passage in his 
1993 article, where he writes ‘the first principle covering the equal basic rights and 
liberties may easily be preceded by a lexically prior principle requiring that citizens’ 
basic needs be met, at least insofar as their being met is necessary for citizens to 
understand and to be able fruitfully to exercise [their] rights and liberties. Certainly 
any such principle must be assumed in applying the first principle’ (Rawls 1993: 7). 
He did not pursue this thought, but others have done. 
 
Thus for example, Pogge argues: ‘If the account of social primary goods is to reflect a 
plausible notion of human needs then it cannot deny the fundamental role basic social 
and economic needs actually play in a human life…  The first principle would then 
require that an institutional scheme should, if feasible, guarantee to every participant 
sufficient socio-economic goods for meeting the basic social and economic needs of a 
normal human person participating in the relevant social system... (these are) the 
standard basic socio-economic needs within some social system' (Pogge, 1989: 
133,143). In a related way, we argue that the principle of justice concerns the right to 
basic need satisfaction; and go on to advocate the equal prioritisation of rights to basic 
need satisfaction (THN 132–4). More recently, Wolf has gone further and concluded 
that ‘meeting people’s basic needs should be the first priority of justice’ (Wolf 2009: 
355). 
 
This has implications for the extension of Rawlsian justice theory to peoples beyond 
the (welfare) state and to future generations. It is well known that Rawls (1993) drew 
back from extending the veil of ignorance beyond the nation state and encountered 
grave problems in extending it to future generations. However Brock (2009) and Wolf 
(2009) among others challenge this (cf. Caney 2005). In extending it to these domains 
they question his key distributive claim – the difference principle – and reintroduce 
basic human needs. Brock asserts that, behind the veil of ignorance, negotiators would 
16  First, equal basic rights and liberties; second, the difference principle, that socially inequality 
is tolerated only to the extent that it benefits the least well off in society, together with 
equality of opportunity (Rawls 1971: 63, 538-9) 
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 choose not the maximisation of the income of the worst off, but maximising average 
income alongside the provision of a needs-based minimum floor.17 Brock argues that 
this provides a more sound normative and political foundation with which to extend 
social justice arguments to the global sphere.  
 
Wolf, as we have seen, also favours and prioritises a needs principle and asserts that is 
must be generation-neutral. This results he argues in a principle of moderate 
sufficiency: that people be provided with a sufficient minimum as first principle of 
justice. Applied to intergenerational justice it results in a similar cosmopolitan 
conclusion, in effect substantiating the Brundtland Report: ‘Such a principle implies a 
strict limit on the kinds of intergenerational trade-offs justice will permit when the 
interests of present and future persons are in conflict... Thus it will be impermissible 
to promote the less basic interests of members of the present generation if this would 
compromise the needs of future generations’ (Wolf 2009: 367). Future human needs 
take precedence over present wants. This is similar to an earlier argument by Dobson: 
‘The futurity that is central to all conceptions of sustainability is represented by the 
way in which future generation human needs take precedence over present generation 
human wants. It would be odd for those who argue for the sustaining of ecological 
processes to put the wants of the present generation of human beings (which might 
threaten those processes) ahead of the needs of future generations of human beings 
(which depend upon them)’ (Dobson 1998:46).  
 
These arguments can be applied to threats from climate change. ‘Since protection 
from harm is a matter of basic need, and since significant climate mitigation can be 
accomplished without compromising the needs of present persons, climate policy is an 
urgent priority of justice… Where our present activities are not necessary for 
satisfaction of present fundamental needs, and put at risk the basic needs of future 
generations, then they are unjust’ (Wolf 2009:373). In foreseeable scenarios they may 
threaten survival itself (for a full discussion see Gosseries and Meyer 2009). Such 
arguments stand or fall according to whether there is a secure idea of what human 
needs are. That is what this paper has sought to provide.18 
 
17  Brock, ch. 3.1. This is backed by empirical evidence from an extensive series of experiments 
conducted by Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) which found after discursive negotiation that 
only 1% of participants supported a difference principle but 78% supported a floor constraint 
principle. 
18  The foregoing arguments assume that what matters is maintaining or improving future human 
welfare. They recognise the instrumental role played by large-scale ecological processes, such 
as climate and biodiversity, and the critical limits these impose on human wellbeing. But they 
do not recognise an intrinsic value of Nature, which might imply giving priority to nonhuman 
needs over human needs, now or in the future (Dobson 1998).  
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 Conclusion 
The Brundtland Commission’s near-hegemonic definition of sustainable development, 
with which we began, relies on a robust and coherent account of what human needs 
are. It would make no sense to substitute the term ‘preferences’ or ‘happiness’ for 
needs in their definition, and ‘capabilities’ are fundamentally unspecific. Thus one 
would imagine that the Brundtland Commission and the numerous papers citing it 
would at least define the term ‘needs’ and engage with the concept. But on the whole 
this has not happened. It is this gap which this paper seeks to fill. (A similar gap in 
social policy prompted the writing of our earlier book, A Theory of Human Need: 
everywhere welfare policy was justified in terms of ‘need’ but nowhere was it 
analysed, unless to be denigrated).  
 
This paper draws on the earlier work, but engages with subsequent critiques, analysis 
and new formulations of need theory – and parallel discussions of wellbeing, notably 
within the capabilities school. Its key conclusion is that the preference satisfaction 
theory of wellbeing is hopelessly inadequate to deal with the global and 
intergenerational dilemmas posed by climate change and global inequality. Happiness 
has even less to contribute. This paper adds to those critiques but provides the 
beginnings of an alternative.  
 
This conclusion summarises three basic strengths of need theory.  
 
First, because human needs are conceived to be universal to all peoples, a sound 
theory of need permits interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing, including comparisons 
between radically different cultures and time periods. It is informationally more 
rewarding than alternative conceptions, encompassing both individual and population-
level evaluations of wellbeing. It provides a more secure theoretical foundation for the 
numerous current empirical efforts to devise non-monetary indicators of wellbeing, 
pursued by numerous organisations including the OECD, EU and UN (Whitby et al 
2014). 
 
Second, it provides a critique of ‘unexamined sentiments’ and an advocacy of 
reflective and public reasoning. This it shares with the capabilities approach, but it has 
the advantage that human needs are more ‘vividly intuitive’. It the idea of common 
human needs challenges current obeisance to unregulated markets as allocative 
mechanisms (and indeed simple majoritarian decision-making). Needs provide a route 
to questioning the idea of ‘consumer sovereignty’ and the justice of current social 
structures. 
 
Third, it supports strong moral obligations and claims to meet basic needs and an 
argument for prioritising them over want or preferences. It thus lends powerful 
support for the pursuit of both social and intergenerational justice: the twin and 
interlinked global challenges according to both Brundtland and Stern. This is critical 
to mitigating climate change in a context of egregious global inequality. A sound 
23 
 
 concept of universal basic human needs is now more essential than ever to conceive of 
alternative policies to simultaneously sustain the planet and human wellbeing.  
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